What is the effect of exposing motivated youth to firm management in practice? To answer this question, Abebe, Fafchamps, Koelle and Quinn (2019) place young professionals for one month in established firms to shadow middle managers.
The paper, by Adhikari and Sapkota (2018), has twofold objectives: to measure management practices from the employer perspective of both public and private hospitals of Nepal, and to explore the relationship between management practices and output indicators of the hospitals by utilizing data collec
When contracting institutions are weak or exploitable, firms in developing countries rely on a mixture of social and formal heuristics to select business partners.
Economic growth requires confidence in the state's ability to enforce secure exchange. But when states selectively enforce rule of law, political considerations can moderate the trust that buyers have in sellers.
Property rights are important for economic exchange, but in much of the world they are not publicly guaranteed. Private market associations can fill this gap by providing an institutional structure to enforce agreements, but with this power comes the ability to extort from group members.
Alfonsi, Bandiera, Bassi, Burgess, Rasul, Sulaiman and Vitali (2019) design a labor market experiment to compare demand- and supply-side policies to tackle youth unemployment, a key issue in low-income countries.
In Ethiopia, Blattman, Dercon and Franklin (2019) randomly assign mostly female jobseekers to receive an industrial job offer or an unconditional cash transfer, meant to spur self-employment.
