Browse all publications

The strength of contract enforcement determines how firms source inputs and organize production. Using microdata on Indian manufacturing plants, Boehm and Oberfield (2018) show that production and sourcing decisions appear systematically distorted in states with weaker enforcement.

The data presented in this article by Nchake, Edwards and Rankin (2018) are related to the research article entitled “Closer monetary union and product market integration in emerging economies: Evidence from the Common Monetary Area in Southern Africa” (M. A. Nchake, L. Edwards, N. Rankin, 2017).

Firms in developing countries often avoid paying taxes by making informal payments to tax officials. These bribes may raise the cost of operating a business, and the price charged to consumers.

Fixed-term contract employment has increasingly replaced regular open-ended employment as the predominant form of employment notably in developing countries. Guided by factory-level evidence showing nuanced patterns of co-movements of regular and contract wages, Basu et al.