This study by Brudevold-Newman, Honorati, Jakiela and Ozier (2017) presents results from a randomized evaluation of two labor market interventions targeted to young women aged 18 to 19 years in three of Nairobi’s poorest neighborhoods.
Existing theories of coups against democracy emphasize that elite incentives to mount a coup depend on the threat that democracy represents to them and what they stand to gain from dictatorship.
Preliminary results indicate that trainees have strong preferences over salary and job locations and their placement officers (who are solely responsible for trainee placements) have poor knowledge of these preferences.
Firms frequently engage in repeated trade despite the availability of alternative business partners. A large literature shows how such relationships affect market outcomes, but less is known about how changes in market structure affect these relationships.
Existing theories of democratic reversals emphasize that economic incentives should determine when elites resist democracy. Naidu, Robinson and Young (2017) argue that the capacity to organize coups against democracy is also important, and is shaped by the structure of the social network.
In this short paper, published in the American Economic Review, Atkin, Chaudhry, Chaudry, Khandelwal and Verhoogen (2015) directly asked firms about their mark-ups.
Brudevold-Newman, Honorati, Jakiela and Ozier (2017) evaluated two interventions that eased credit constraints in slightly different ways: a multifaceted ‘microfranchising’ programme eased both financial and human capital constraints by providing training and physical capital to recipients, while an
Garlick, Orkin and Quinn (2017) run the first randomised controlled trial to compare microenterprise data from surveys of different frequency and medium. They randomly assign enterprises to monthly in-person, weekly in-person, or weekly phone panel surveys.
