In all modern bureaucracies, politicians retain some discretion in public employment decisions, which may lead to frictions in the selection process if political connections substitute for individual competence.
This project will study whether customs officers affect firms’ bribery costs and trade costs, and how these officers' time horizons and professional relationships operate as mechanisms.
The shift from subsistence to commercial economies creates surplus, but often induces conflict over it. Under extractive institutions and weak contract enforcement, crony capitalism may emerge and limit the benefits of modernization.
Colonnelli and Prem (2019) estimate the causal real economic effects of a randomized anticorruption crackdown on local governments in Brazil over the period 2003-2014.
Economic growth requires confidence in the state's ability to enforce secure exchange. But when states selectively enforce rule of law, political considerations can moderate the trust that buyers have in sellers.
This project examines how the political power of market associations and local government effectiveness affect contractual trade and extortion in Lagos.
