Institutions

Commerce requires trust, but trust is difficult when one group can expropriate another using violence or social power.

This study presents a new economic perspective on state-building based on a case study in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s hinterland. We explore the implications for the state of considering rebels as stationary bandits.

We use a sharp withdrawal of the state that precipitated a rise in insecurity in the Democratic Republic of the Congo to analyze the role of community in the rise of militias.

In developing countries, access to opportunities within the private sector are often unequally distributed. Advantages accrue to those with connections to the state or to those with privileged social status.

We use original data on the locations of militant commanders, attacks on the petroleum industry, and oil theft to show that a 2009 amnesty concluding the Niger Delta oil conflict led to sustained declines in militant activity and growth in oil theft.

What would happen if a poor country were to be integrated with a richer neighbor? Our analysis of the reunification of South and North Korea shows convergence of income between countries but divergence within.

Commerce requires trust, but trust is difficult when one group consistently fears expropriation by another.

Property rights are important for economic exchange, but in many parts of the world, they are not publicly guaranteed.