India

Mining industries form a significant share of the industrial landscape of many poor countries.

Wan and Chandrasekhar (2019) study how the quality of decision making, in this case by credit officers, depends on (1) whether decisions are made at the group or individual level, (2) whether soft information is available beyond hard information, and (3) the incentive structure that officers face.

A commonly held and highly intuitive view is that intensified competition will improve the allocation of resources in an economy, by shifting resources to more productive firms.

Adhvaryu, Nyshadham and Xu (2018) report impacts of a randomized housing quality improvement intervention among Indian migrant workers.

Banerjee and Chiplunkar (2018) provide evidence of substantial matching frictions in the labour market in India. In particular, placement officers in vocational training institutes have very little information about the job preferences of candidates they are trying to place in jobs.

The strength of contract enforcement determines how firms source inputs and organize production. Using microdata on Indian manufacturing plants, Boehm and Oberfield (2018) show that production and sourcing decisions appear systematically distorted in states with weaker enforcement.

The timely enforcement of supplier contracts by courts of justice is an important determinant of firms’ organizational structure and overall productivity.

Several field experiments find positive returns to grants for male and not female micro- entrepreneurs. But these analyses overlook that female entrepreneurs often reside with a male business owner.

This paper by Beáta Itin-Shwartz (2017) investigates competition and market share dominance in the Indian fertilizer sector during a process of deregulation, using a newly constructed database.