Corruption

Crunch Time: How Bureaucrats' Term of Office Affects Coercive and Collusive Bribes

This project will study whether customs officers affect firms’ bribery costs and trade costs, and how these officers' time horizons and professional relationships operate as mechanisms.

Research Project
1 Nov 2019

Political Connections and Access to Private-Sector Growth: Evidence from an Audit Experiment in Senegal

This project examines whether political and personal connections, as well as co-ethnicity, co-religiosity and gender, affect access to institutions.

Research Project
1 Oct 2019

Corruption and Firms

Colonnelli and Prem (2019) estimate the causal real economic effects of a randomized anticorruption crackdown on local governments in Brazil over the period 2003-2014.

Working Paper
1 Sep 2019

Social, Formal, and Political Determinants of Trade under Weak Rule of Law: Experimental Evidence from Senegalese Firms

When contracting institutions are weak or exploitable, firms in developing countries rely on a mixture of social and formal heuristics to select business partners.

Working Paper
17 Jun 2019

The Political Determinants of Economic Exchange: Evidence from a Business Experiment in Senegal

Economic growth requires confidence in the state's ability to enforce secure exchange. But when states selectively enforce rule of law, political considerations can moderate the trust that buyers have in sellers.

Working Paper
1 Apr 2019

Bribes vs. Taxes: Market Structure and Incentives

Firms in developing countries often avoid paying taxes by making informal payments to tax officials. These bribes may raise the cost of operating a business, and the price charged to consumers.

Working Paper
6 Jul 2018

The industrial organisation of taxation: Evidence from within the police administration in the Democratic Republic of Congo

This project seeks to collect a novel, in-depth dataset on corruption amongst police officers in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Research Project
1 May 2015

The Effect of Market Association Political Power and Local Government Effectiveness on Trade: Evidence from Nigeria

This project examines how the political power of market associations and local government effectiveness affect contractual trade and extortion in Lagos.

Research Note
25 Jul 2014