In developing countries financial frictions hinder firm growth. Credit constraints result from poor contract enforcement and asymmetric information in the credit market. One solution is to provide infrastructure for lenders to share information on borrowers' credit history, which can mitigate adverse selection and improve repayment incentives, reduce resource misallocation and accelerate rm growth. Information flow facilitates informal enforcement which may be particularly important in an environment where formal (legal) enforcement is weak. I investigate the barriers to and impact of introducing an information sharing service for small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and their trade credit providers (suppliers) in the retail sector in Kenya, by means of randomized information intervention and subsidy of take-up. I focus on borrowers and lenders' decisions to adopt and share information, as well as the impact of the service in reducing information asymmetry, increasing borrowers' repayment incentives, buyer-supplier relationships and spillover among retail shops. I find that offering free credit reports to retail shops increases credit report ownership and knowledge, as well as shops' likelihood of applying for supplier credit, but not access to supplier credit. Lack of response from the supplier side seems driven by their unwillingness to rely on information in the credit reports as well as some suppliers' lack of ability to provide credit.
